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President's Page 
To Treat Or Not To Treat 
At our recent annual meeting, Richard McCormick, S.J. made some 
observations relative to the need for therapy in newborn defective 
children which were first voiced in his article on the same subject in 
the Journal of The American Medical Association, July 8, 1974. It is 
Father McCormick's opinion that" ... life is not a value to be pre-
served in and for itself ... it is a value to be preserved precisely as a 
condition for other values. Since these other values cluster around and 
are rooted in human relationships, it seems to follow that life is a 
value to be preserved precisely only insofar as it contains some poten-
tiality for human relationships. When in human judgment this poten-
tiality is totally absent or would be utterly submerged and undeveloped 
in the mere struggle to survive, that life has achieved its potential." 
The implication being that such an individual because of the quality 
of his life should not receive life preserving medical therapy. The basis 
for the judgment whether or not to institute therapy would be the 
projected nature of this individual's life. In other words, an ethical 
judgment is called for regarding the existence of a human being based 
on the value of that individual's life to himself and whether this can be 
achieved or fulfilled by his continued existence. 
Father McCormick has done a distinct service to all who are charged 
with the care of these seriously iII patients by his careful analysis of 
the problem before us, particularly by his indication that the tra-
ditional guidelines of ordinary-extraordinary means have lost much of 
their usefulness in modern clinical practice because of the necessity 
of their application on a situational basis. We must remember, how-
ever, that the quality of life ethic applied as a determinant as to 
whether or not a human being should be treated or sustained exposes 
the individual and society to a perilous path. One need only remember 
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the experience of German medicine chronicled by Frederic Wertham 
in "A Sign for Cain" to recall that the first application of Binding 
and Hoche's thesis of "The Release of the Destruction of Life Devoid 
of Value" was in defective pediatric patients, many of whom I am sure 
were in the same category as that which prompts this discussion . 
It would seem to me that the physician facing the therapeutic 
quandary of the seriously defective newborn must consider the merits 
of three methods of ethical analysis available. 
a) Ordinary·extraordinary means, which has serious defects in prac ti ca l a p· 
plication because of its situational base. 
b ) A guideline centered on "the potentia l for human relationships associated 
with the infant's condition," suggested by Father McCormick and which 
I would te rm a considera tion based on a n assessment of the individual's 
prospective quality of life. The application of this principle in clinical 
practice ~ould require a degree of onmiscience quite beyond the limits of 
a ny known human agency, including the fallible physician . For example , 
cerebra l palsy victims whose ability to participate in the "goods" of life 
may not be disce rnible for m any yea rs a fte r the ir bi rth. Here we see a 
common phenomenon in which observe rs of the m edical discipline grant 
to the physician discriminato ry powers which a re beyond his abilities. 
c) A method restricted to considerations of therapeutic benefit for the pa· 
tient. How much better is the approach of the physicia n when faced with 
the cl inica l problem as to the wisdom of instituting or continuing medica l 
or surgical the ra py fo r a defective newborn child, or se riously damaged 
adult fo r that matte r, who makes hi s dec is ion not on the basis of whe the r 
or not his patient can fulfill hi s potentia l for huma n relationship, but 
rather on the bas is that eve ry huma n life has intrins ic worth, potentia l 
or fulfill ed, and that the decision for therapy should be based solely on 
whethe r this form of m edical the ra py can be expected to restore the ill or 
defect ive child to that sta te of hea lth for which the the rapy was planned. 
Two examples of this are the anencephalic child with a tracheo-esophageal 
fi stula which I would not treat and the mongoloid child with the tracheo-
esophagea l fi stula which I have treated. In the first instance cor rection 
of the T-E fistula would 110t resto re the pa tient to a sta te of health becau se 
the ve ry na ture of the anencepha ly would resul t in the child 's dea th from 
other causes within a short period of time even with surgica l inte rvention. 
In the second instance t.he intervent.ion would restore the defective child 
to a s tate of health com patible with the pursuit of a life whose quality 
was o rda ined by our Creator. The sam e principle of instituting o r dis-
continuing therapy on the basis of its efficacy in achieving the goa ls for 
which it is planned is applicable to decisions rega rding therapy for 
severely damaged ca rdiac or neuro-surgical pa tients when we di scontinue 
respirato rs after it has become ev ident that their furthe r u se cannot 
possibly restore the patient to health even though the patient may have 
va ry ing a bilities to fulfill hi s potentia l for human relationships. 
The physician should never be placed or place himself in the position 
of determining whether his patient should live or die on the basis of his 
judgment concerning the quality of the patient's life but should prop-
erly make his decision on whether or not his therapy will be of bene-
fit to his patient. Physicians are the agents of the patient, not {)f the 
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relatives or society. Neither does the physician have the attributes or 
perquisites of the Creator to determine whether or not this particular 
human being should exist. The fundamental questions (What are the 
minimal elements of human personhood? What are the minimal meas-
ures necessary for the sustenance of human life?) go unanswered. Cer-
tainly the resolution of these questions is mandatory before any broad 
guidelines can be applicable in clinical practice. 
Edward G. Kilroy, M.D. 
Editorial 
Definition of Death 
It has been proposed that the moment of human death be defined 
as the moment of irreversible cessation of both respiratory and cardiac 
function , and in the event that these functions are being maintained 
artificially, the moment of irreversible cessation of cerebral function 
be defined as the moment of death . 
It is my contention that such a definition of death is too narrowly 
drawn and too rigid in its requirements that the failure of a particular 
organ system must be present to establish the reality ' of clinical or 
legal death. This definition does not conform to the biological reality 
that death of an organism occurs when that organism's biological sys-
tems undergo an irreversible loss of the ability to maintain vital func-
tions. A pacemaker and/ or circulatory assist devices may preserve 
cardiac functions, and artificial ventilators respiratory function in-
definitely with normal cerebral function - a form of "living death." 
Conversely, total cessation of brain function may occur and as long 
as artificial respiration is maintained spontaneous cardiac function 
can occur and be maintained. If we were to ahere to this definition 
of death, the practicing physician would be obligated to maintain all 
efforts to maintain "life" as the New Jersey's Quinlan case seems 
to be saying. It is my feeling that such a definition of death would 
expose the physician to unwarranted malpractice liability if he did 
not continue all medical therapy until cessation of cerebral function 
was established and would require extensive clinical and laboratory 
documentation of cessation of cerebral function in every case, which is 
clearly not indicated in the majority of clinical situations. Another 
failing of this type of definition is the inability of such a legal state-
ment to apply to changing events in medical knowledge regarding 
what bodily functions are truly necessary to maintain life. What is 
cerebral death this year may not be cerebral death next year, etc. 
The patient and physician would be much better served by a much 
broader definition of death which would leave to the attending phy-
sician the employment of all his clinical experience and the most -ad-
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